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Abstract 
 
In recent years, increasing monopolization tendencies in the market for electronic informa-
tion resources in the academic sector have led to the formation of consortia by university 
libraries and other academic institutions, which are intended to act as an antipole to increase 
their bargaining power against the monopolistic structures of the publisher market. 
The aim of this research paper is the development of a model that determines minimal-cost 
structures for buying consortia in the context of academic libraries. Two different points of 
view are discussed: on the one hand the optimal choice of the pricing model for purchasing 
electronic journals and on the other hand the optimization of consortia structures for bun-
dling bargaining power. For the first part of the framework a break-even based approach is 
developed and applied to empirical data. It can be shown, that German academic libraries 
can cut their procurement costs by canceling subscriptions and switching to pay per view by 
about 30%. The second topic – the consortia structure problem – is solved by a binary non-
linear optimization model, which also is applied to a real situation. In future it is able to de-
termine, for example, the optimality of a Germany-wide library consortium and to show effi-
cient alternatives.  
 
Keywords: Academic Libraries, Publishers, Procurement Consortia, Optimization, Electronic 
Journals 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, increasing monopolization tendencies in the market for electronic information 
resources in the academic sector have led to the formation of consortia by university libraries 
and other academic institutions, which are intended to act as an antipole to increase their bar-
gaining power against the also monopolistic structures of the publisher market (McCabe 
2002). This trend can be seen in several countries like Germany, the United Kingdom, Swit-
zerland and the Netherlands (Okerson 1996; Wiesner and Dugall 2002). In the United States 
library consortia can only be found rarely, the most important one being OHIO-Link 
(http://www.lib.ohio-state.edu/).  
In Germany, due to the federal financing structure, most of the consortia are organized re-
gionally; procurement cooperation with a thematic focus is not common (Degkwitz and An-
dermann 2003). Recently, such trends have not had any counteractive effect on the increasing 
prices in the academic information market, e.g. for electronic journals and databases. The 
NESLI-Project in the United Kingdom, which had the aim of negotiating the general terms 
for libraries and publishers, failed in 2002 (Walport 2003). 
The aim of this research paper is the development of a model that determines minimal-cost 
structures for buying consortia in the context of academic libraries. In the process two differ-
ent points of view will be discussed: on the one hand the optimal choice of the pricing model 
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for purchasing electronic journals and on the other hand the optimization of the consortia 
structures for bundling bargaining power.  
Both parts of the framework are applied to a real scenario: the procurement relationship of the 
Hessian1 library consortium HeBIS, which consists of 122 academic libraries, and a large in-
ternational publisher of scientific journals. Section 2 describes the actual situation of scien-
tific journal procurement in Germany and provides some basic empirical data. In section 3 the 
model is developed in three steps – optimization of the pricing portfolio, optimization of con-
sortia structures, and simultaneous optimization of both – and applied to empirical data, 
which was extracted from earlier work (Dugall and Fladung 2002a). Section 4 gives a short 
summary and an overview over further research. 
 
2. Electronic Procurement of Scientific Information 
 
2.1 Participating Actors and Market Structure 
The market for academic journals basically consists of four major actors: scientists who pro-
duce the academic content, publishers who collect this content, libraries who buy the pub-
lishers´ products, and finally again researchers and students who use the academic literature 
in libraries (Odlyzko 1997). The actual situation is characterized by the paradox that the pub-
licly funded academic libraries have to repurchase the digital content which is mostly “pro-
duced” by also publicly financed scientists (Degkwitz and Andermann 2003). 
Libraries which claim to have a virtually complete information stock or the fact that research 
and teaching are confronted with a very problematic development, is also known as the crisis 
of academic information provision (Bergstrom and Bergstrom 2002; Wiesner and Dugall 
2002). While the prices of electronic journals and databases have continuously escalated dur-
ing the last several years, the libraries´ budgets have moved in a downward direction. Major 
commercial publishers like Reed Elsevier or Kluwer/Springer, who publish lots of journals 
with a high reputation, can raise their content prices without fearing that any library will can-
cel the subscription. The main reason for this effect is the lack of competition along the 
highly specialised journals and a lack of elasticity of demand for the “need-to-know”-product 
academic information (Degkwitz and Andermann 2003). Normally, scientific journals do not 
compete by pricing; the libraries’ procurement strategy is determined by the demand of the 
end users who do not usually have to pay for the journals (Odlyzko 1997). A further impor-
tant trend in the market for scientific communication is the enormously growing relevance of 
electronic information since the late 90s. Electronically-accessible information has a lot of 
advantages in comparison to the printed equivalents; e.g. electronic content can be more eas-
ily found and searched, can be theoretically accessed anytime and from anywhere, and be 
handled more flexibly. Online access to academic information can lead to an acceleration and 
increase of efficiency in intellectual production by the scientific community (NN 2001). On 
the one hand in the present time of decreasing budgets academic libraries have to cancel ex-
isting subscriptions in order to be able to finance other relevant literature (Wiesner and 
Dugall 2002), and on the other hand publishers try to protect their revenue while bundling 
electronic access with hardcopies of the same journals. Often, libraries can only purchase a 
pre-selected set of journals bundled by the publishers and more often the basic contract fixes 
the price of cancelling subscriptions (Degkwitz and Andermann 2003).  
Recently, academic libraries have reacted by reorganization and by forming buying consortia 
to bundle the demand and to get a better bargaining position (Wiesner and Dugall 2002). 
 
 
 
1 Hesse is the fifth largest German state with about 6 M inhabitants. The largest city is Frankfurt/Main. 
2 The number of participating libraries can differ from year to year and publisher-related contract. 
2.2 Academic Library Consortia in Germany 
At present, German academic libraries are primarily organized in 16 consortia with around 90 
participating libraries (Reinhardt 2003). They differ in size, in their importance as negotiators, 
in their legal form, in their financial base and in their human resources. The larger German 
consortia are organized in regional structures because of the federal financial public system in 
Germany (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Map of states and active consortia in Germany (in 2003) [Reinhardt 2003] 
Publishers are afraid of losing sales volume in the print-media area when providing the con-
tents on the internet, whereas electronic resources will not unwind these losses (Phillips and 
Phillips 2002). Because of its medium the electronic version has two main characteristics that 
influence the sales situation of the publishers significantly: 
• Due to the possibility of electronic access there is no necessity to subscribe to multiple 
copies of the same printed journal. This fact is amplified by establishing consortia 
(cross access, cf. 2.3.1). 
• The distribution channel causes additional costs for software development, care and  
maintenance as well as for hardware acquisition. 
The first aspect in particular causes the publishers to connect prices for electronic access to 
the journals subscribed to in the print-version (Meier 2002). Normally, these offers are com-
bined with a clause that makes the printed journals non-unsubscribable to prevent sales de-
creases (Anglada and Comellas 2002). The frequently found high complexity of contract con-
ditions for consortial subscription does not allow the advantages to be estimated. Often the 
pricing makes a fair assignment of costs related to single access impossible (Dugall and Fla-
dung 2002b). 
Former research approaches were limited to the description of present pricing models and 
their economic implications for the publishers’ earnings (Getz 1999; Odlyzko 1997; Okerson 
1996; Varian 1996). Odlyzko addresses the question of competition on the scientific literature 
market and the implications of the quasi-monopolistic price ranges of single publishers as 
well as alternative methods of publishing. He comes to the result that the present publishing 
system cannot be financed in future, and that scientists will have to support alternative op-
tions opened up by electronic publication (Odlyzko 1997), e.g. academic self-organized re-
positories. Further on Odlyzko sees the possibility of cost reduction by using variably priced 
document delivery services (Odlyzko 1996). 
Okerson mentions new challenges for libraries and publishers in terms of the increased 
amount of work in information editing and processing as well as in pricing (Okerson 1996). 
McCabe examines the mergers of publishers and the consequences for prices (McCabe 2002). 
His examination provides evidence for the fact that the high concentration on the content 
supplier side makes monopoly profits possible (McCabe 2002). 
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All previous works in this field have in common that there is neither a decision making model 
for the libraries or consortia nor an empirical investigation that shows at least rudimentary 
consequences of alternative pricing models. 
One of our earlier research works dealt with the usage of electronic journals (Dugall and Fla-
dung 2002a). One major result over all investigated libraries and publisher is that 50% of the 
full text accesses within a period are limited to around 7% of the titles. 80% of the accesses 
are taken up by around 25% of the titles. Further, the analysis showed that around 63% of the 
relevant journals on the average were recalled under 12 (!) times per year and library. On av-
erage 97% are requested fewer than 120 times per year (in full text, i.e. one article). (Dugall 
and Fladung 2002a). 
 
2.3 Existing Pricing Models 
The currently available pricing models for procuring electronic journals are the fixed-price 
calculation based on existing subscriptions to paper-based journals and pay per view (ppv). 
 
2.3.1 Subscription-based Fixed Price Calculation 
The pricing model based on subscribed print-media (surcharge model) is commonly used for 
electronic journals and will be explained by an example in the following (Dugall and Fladung 
2002a): 
The monetary amount of subscriptions in the HeBIS-consortium for printed journals of a 
large sized publisher was around € 1,605,586 (net) in 2001 including multiple subscriptions of 
the same journal. The license (€ 189,250 (net)) included cross access, so consorted libraries 
were allowed to access issues they did not have physically in stock at their own location elec-
tronically. The license surcharge for electronical access was 15%. This shows that the basic 
cost for subscribed print-media does not include the printed version of the journal only, but an 
option for electronic usage, too. Taking the option causes additional costs amounting to the 
surcharge. 
The license allows all members of the consortium electronic access to the journals subscribed 
to by at least one member of the consortium in printed form (cross access) and named in the 
contract.  
In general, the basic costs for consortia are calculated on multiple print subscriptions, while 
libraries that act alone have only to take into account one copy of the relevant journal to de-
termine the basic costs.  
 
2.3.2 Pay per View 
In contrast to the fixed-price surcharge model presented in section 2.3.1, the pay per view-
model (ppv) assumes that every single access to a complete journal article (“full text”) is 
charged with a specific amount. The costs for electronic access to a journal result from the 
number of calls and the price per call. The cost rate can differ from journal to journal, but 
presently there is no price differentiation for ppv-journals. 
 
3. A Framework for Optimizing the Procurement of Scientific Journals 
To optimize the procurement of electronic journals from a global view, i.e. the minimization 
of the aggregate expenses of all considered libraries, multiple strategies are imaginable. 
Firstly, by evaluating the demand statistics costs-cutting decisions about a change in the pric-
ing model to ppv could be made. In this model subscriptions to printed journal are one of the 
optimization parameters and therefore endogenous. consider 
Secondly, the size and structure of consortia for bundling the bargaining power against the 
publishers could be optimized. In contrast to the first examination subscriptions to the hard-
copy version of the relevant journals are only input parameters and therefore exogenous. 
 
Figure 2: Optimization strategies 
Finally, we will give a possible approach to minimizing costs by a simultaneous solution 
method. In this model the print subscriptions are endogenous and object of the optimization 
again. 
 
3.1 Optimization of Individual Journal Portfolios 
 
3.1.1 Model Description 
A change of the currently existing procurement practice from a pure surcharge model to a 
mixed pricing portfolio, including ppv for the less demanded journals, can have an impact on 
different elements of the subscription license. If we assume that all journals of a single pub-
lisher would be bought by a fixed-price subscription, all printed copies form the base for cal-
culating the price for the electronic version. If a journal is not demanded often a library might 
change the annual subscription to ppv purchasing. In that case the library also abandons the 
printed journal. This effect can be neglected; empirical studies showed that the demand for 
printed journals will be almost non-existent, if the electronic version is available (Keller 
2002). 
In essence, the decision model consists in essence of a break-even analysis, which determines 
the cost-minimal pricing alternative for every journal. To apply a break-even analysis the 
expected usage degree dk for every journal has to be estimated, which will be done by the 
linear extrapolation of historical data, and be varied within a sensitivity analysis to decrease 
the probability of wrong decisions. 
 
3.1.2 Model Application 
The following application of the model is based on an empirical survey of the electronic jour-
nals usage within the Hessian library consortium HeBIS in 2001 (Dugall and Fladung 2002a). 
Although only the journal portfolio of one exemplary publisher is presented here, the journals 
of different publishers were included in the survey; the results are transferable to the other 
ones. 
In 2001, 965 periodic journal subscriptions existed for different printed journals published by 
the particular publisher. When removing multiple subscriptions to the same journal, 550 titles 
will remain.  
The basic subscription costs for the printed journals amounted to € 1,605,586 and the licens-
ing costs were at a level of € 189,250, so in total the procurement costs added up to € 
1,794,836. Divided by the total number of accesses (229,898) the average costs per access to 
an electronic article amounted to € 7.81. 
In the following the break-even analysis is applied to this data base. The first calculation 
shows the resulting costs when assuming a (quite realistic) ppv fee of cv = € 25.00, a license 
cost factor of α = 0.15 (15%) and an estimated demand growth factor of γ = 0.0. 
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Figure 3: Procurement costs subject to pricing portfolio 
Figure 3 shows the costs which result, when switching the fixed price fee for the x% least 
used journals to ppv. For the explored journal portfolio under the given conditions it would be 
cost-minimal to switch the pricing model to ppv for about the 24% (132 journals) least de-
manded journals. By realizing this, portfolio costs could be reduced by about more than 15%. 
To analyze the impact of cv in the next step it will be varied between € 20 and 50 per access. γ 
and α remain constant at their previous values. 
In Figure 4 it can be seen, that even with high access fees total savings of over 5.6% could be 
achieved, assuming the demand level of 2001. Depending on the level of cv savings of be-
tween € 93.700 and € 274.678 could be achieved. Again, it should be mentioned that this is 
only for the journal portfolio of one publisher. Even if € 50 had to be paid per view, 15% of 
the journals should be bought in that way. 
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Figure 4: Savings and minimal costs at different ppv fees 
The most stochastic parameter is the access frequency dk. To test the sensitivity of this pa-
rameter it will be varied between γ = 0.0 and 2.0, i.e. a tripling of the demand. Again, the fee 
is set to cv = € 25. 
Figure 5 shows the results. Even when the usage of electronic journals is tripled switching of 
some journals (11.6%) to ppv is efficient and leads to savings up to € 50,000 (i.e. 3%). 
However, longitudinal studies showed that the number of requests didn’t vary strongly be-
tween several years (Dugall and Fladung 2002a).  
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Figure 5: Procurement costs and savings at different demand growth rates 
 
3.2 Optimization of Consortia Structures 
 
3.2.1 Model Description 
Based on the general conditions described in chapter 2 in the following we present a norma-
tive model, which optimizes – given a set of libraries – the number and structure of consortia, 
the libraries should be organized in, and minimizes the total (i.e. over all libraries) costs for 
procuring electronic journals. The optimization is done only from a centralized perspective; 
individual incentives and goals of the different libraries will not be considered. The total costs, 
which are minimized by the model, consist of all libraries’ procurement costs as well as their 
administrative costs, which result from managing the procurement process and coordinating 
consortia.  
The model is based on the following assumptions, which have partly simplifying character:  
• The number of potential consortium members is known. 
• A particular library can only be member of one consortium (for the procure-
ment of journals from one publisher). 
• The existing subscriptions of printed journals are known. 
• The demand for every journal at every library is known or can be estimated 
adequately. 
• The costs for print-subscriptions of each title are known. 
• Every library offers each journal electronically, independent of an existing 
print-subscription. 
• The surcharge for electronic access is known and identical for each journal 
published by a particular publisher. 
• The licensing costs are lower for libraries which are not members of a consor-
tium. 
• For consortia multiple subscriptions of the same title will be taken into account 
when calculating the costs base; if the library does not act as a consortium 
member only one subscription will be considered. 
• Journals, which are not subscribed to in print, will be accounted for by ppv, 
when demanded electronically. The ppv fee is known and identical for every 
journal. 
• The administrative costs increase super-proportionally with the number of con-
sortium participants. 
The procurement costs as first part of the cost function are aggregated over all libraries and 
depend on the coordination form – stand alone procurement or concerted procurement by a 
consortium. Further, the costs depend on the subscriptions which exist for printed journals. If 
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one library holds a print subscription for a particular journal, none of the other consortium 
members has to pay ppv fees when accessing the electronic version (cross access, cf. 2.3.1). 
Libraries, which are not members of a consortium, have to pay the subscription fees for the 
printed journals (just for one copy) as well as pay-per-view costs for demanding journals 
which are not in the library’s stock. 
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Equation 1: Procurement costs 
Equation 1 describes the calculus of the procurement costs by using different decision vari-
ables and input parameters. These are explained in Table 1. 
Variable zi  is equal to one, if library i is member of a consortium; in this case the complete 
surcharge has to be paid. If it does not cooperate, zi  is 0 and the surcharge α  will be dimin-
ished by θ  (see 8th assumption).  
The level of the basic costs also depends on the coordination form. If the library acts on its 
own ( zi = 0) possible multiple copies of printed journals are not taken into account (the binary 
variable gik  indicates, if a (printed) journal k is in stock at library i). Otherwise (the library is 
member of a consortium) all print subscriptions (including multiple copies of the same jour-
nal within the whole consortium) will be the basis for calculating the basic costs (number of 
copies (or only one) multiplied by the journal’s subscription fee ck
a ). 
To describe consortia in the model we introduced an index j, which stands for procurement 
entities. These entities could either be libraries which act alone or consortia. The binary deci-
sion variable xij  describes which library is assigned to which procurement entity in the opti-
mal solution. If for a particular j only one xij  is equal to one, library i manages its procure-
ment independently; in the other case it is member of a consortium. 
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Table 1: Input parameters and decision variables for procurement costs 
In the last term the ppv costs are formulated. If 0=jky , then the journal is subscribed to by 
none of the libraries in the considered consortium. In this case the demand has to be provided 
by paying for every access. 
The second cost factor is circumscribed as the administrative costs. These depend on the size 
of the libraries and of the consortia. We here assume that libraries can be classified into three 
different groups of size, associated with different levels of administrative costs. The “large”-
group consists of the university libraries, while the state libraries as well as the technical uni-
versities’ libraries are assigned to the “medium” class. The libraries of the universities of ap-
plied sciences (UAS) form the group of small libraries. 
Depending on the coordination form (stand-alone activity vs. consortium) the administrative 
costs vary. For each group of libraries therefore two different administrative cost factors have 
to be determined: cs
ads for acting alone and cs
adk  for being a consortium member. The values 
for cs
ads were acquired by interviews with experts (Table 2). 
Administrative costs per library,
year, and contract cs
ads
Small library 1250
Medium-size library 2500
Large library 3750  
Table 2: Stand-alone administrative costs 
Next, the administrative costs for coordinating in a consortium have to be determined. Em-
pirically it can be shown, that the average administrative costs per member in a consortium 
initially decrease with growing consortium size. But the more participants the consortium 
contains, the larger is the necessary coordination effort, so that the average costs outbalance 
the stand-alone administrative costs above a certain consortium size. 
To formalize this effect we use the consortia administrative cost coefficient 
  and exponentiate the cumulated cost coefficients by a constant 
parameter
{( largemedium,small,sc adks ∈ })β . The resulting administrative cost function is given by Equation 2, the variables 
and parameters used are described in Table 3.  
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Equation 2: Administrative costs 
Variable  is equal to 1, if procurement entity  consists of more than one member (i.e. a 
consortium). The parameter 
u j j
β  has to be larger than 1.0 to ensure the described cost relation-
ship. It can not be ascertained empirically; therefore, it is varied within a sensitivity analysis 
later. 
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Table 3: Input parameters and decision variables for administrative costs 
 787
})
In a last step the consortia administrative costs parameters  for the different libraries’ 
sizes have to be estimated. For that, experts were asked, at which consortium size 
 – assumed that a consortium only consists of libraries of the 
same size – the consortia administrative costs per member have the same level as the stand-
alone administrative costs. 
adk
sc
{( large medium, small,   ∈ssizes*
This break-even point was estimated as a critical consortium size of 10 large, 15 medium-size, 
or 25 small libraries. Given the cs
ads values and a hypothetic determination of β  the values of 
 can be computed by Equation 3. adksc
{ }large medium, small,s   
size
csize
= c   
s
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ssadk
s ∈∀
⋅
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β
 
Equation 3: Derivation of cost coefficients 
Figure 6 shows the average administrative costs per library for varying the size of a homoge-
neous consortium of large libraries. The minimal administrative costs will be reached with a 
consortium size of 4 libraries, the stand-alone administrative costs are again reached at the 
break-even =10. *ssize
Taking the presented cost functions an optimization model can be developed, which mini-
mizes the aggregate costs and determines the optimal consortia structure of the libraries we 
took into account.  
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Figure 6: Exemplary average administrative costs / library for different consortium sizes (homogeneous 
consortium with only large libraries; β=1.3) 
The aggregate of the cost functions is given in the model’s objective in Equation 4. The given 
constraints are added to ensure, that only proper variable values occur. The resulting binary 
non-linear optimization program (INLP) can be solved by appropriate software. 
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Equation 4: Optimization model (INLP) 
Constraint (4-2) ensures that every library becomes member of exactly one procurement en-
tity (stand-alone or member of max. one consortium). (4-3) and (4-4) ensure the correct use of 
uj while the same for zi takes place in conditions (4-6) to (4-9). xij and uj have to be declared 
as binary variables, while the other variables will implicitly accept only values of 0 or 1, 
caused by the given constraints and the impact of the minimization objective. 
 
3.2.2 Model Application 
The presented model in the following is applied to a small real problem to answer the ques-
tion of how the twelve libraries, which are at present organized in the Hessian journal pro-
curement consortium HeBIS, should be linked to minimize the procurement costs for the 514 
scientific journals that are offered by a large international publisher in the market for aca-
demic content.  
To acquire the necessary input parameters (α , θ , β, ci , ci , cads adk ka , , c v gik , hik und dik ) several 
empirical studies were conducted and acquired most of the necessary data for the year 2002. 
The participating libraries and their stand-alone administrative costs are given in Table 4. The 
empirical work discovered the relevant stocks of subscriptions hik  as well as the number of 
electronic calls dik  of every journal in every library. 
Size Library Stand-alone administrative costs per library,
year, and contract, ci
ads
StUB Frankfurt/Main
UB Mainz
UB Gießen
UB Kassel
large
UB Marburg
3750
LB Wiesbaden
HLB Fuldamedium-size
LHB Darmstadt
2500
FHB Frankfurt/Main
FHB Wiesbaden
FHB Darmstadtsmall
FHB Gießen
1250
 
Table 4: Libraries 3 which were included in the investigation and their stand-alone administrative costs 
The following pricing models are offered by the publisher: based on existing print subscrip-
tions the electronic access will be granted for a surcharge of 10% (a=0.1) on top of the print 
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3 The German abbreviations mean: StUB = City and University Library; UB = University Library; LB = State 
Library, LHB = State University Library; FHB = Academy (i.e. UAS) Library 
subscription fees to consortia and for 5% (θ=0.05) to stand-alone libraries. Second, journals 
can be accessed by ppv; for every full article access a fee of c  = 10 € has to be paid. v
The only parameter which could not be gained empirically is β ; therefore, we vary its value 
between 1.05 and 1.5, which again results in varying consortia administrative costs  (also 
depending on the library size).  
adk
ic
The problem we focused on results in a non-linear binary program (Equation 4) with 6,336 
variables (156 binaries) and 12,984 constraints. The 12 libraries can be organized in consortia 
in about 4,213,597 different constellations. The efficient solution method for that problem 
size was a restricted enumeration algorithm, which computed the optimal solution within 
eight hours on an Intel Dual Xeon 2.8 GHz machine. 
The calculations for all β  between 1.05 and 1.5 resulted in the same solution: all 12 libraries 
should be organized in one large consortium to minimize the procurement costs for electronic 
journals published by the publisher in question, given the demand counts and the subscrip-
tions of 2002. 
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Figure 7: Average administrative cost coefficients for different library sizes and different β  
Figure 8 shows the resulting administrative costs and total costs of the optimal solution for 
different β . Increasing β -values correlate with decreasing administrative costs. The reason 
therefore is that for only 12 libraries the administrative costs are always lower within a con-
sortium because of the rather high  values. Furthermore the calculations showed that it 
would be always efficient to realize the cross access by increased subscriptions costs instead 
of pay per view fees. 
*
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Figure 8: Administrative and total costs in optimum (for different β ) 
When varying the ppv fee ( ) instead of c v β  it can be seen that even for halved c  of 5 € the 
solution of only one large consortium stays stable and leads to minimal total costs. 
v
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For the viewed real situation we can deduce that the consortia structure - as it is today – 
achieves minimal total costs (sum of procurement and administrative costs). Of course, this 
result can not simply be transferred to another situation. In each case the existing print sub-
scriptions have to be taken into account. So even for the journal portfolio of another publisher 
the picture can change. If taking more libraries into account, e.g. when thinking about bun-
dling bargaining power by a – currently discussed – Germany-wide consortium, the super-
proportionally increasing administrative costs as well as the higher number of parallel printed 
journal subscriptions which increase the cost base of additional access costs will lead to a 
more fragmented consortia structure. 
 
3.3 Simultaneous Optimization of Portfolios and Consortia Structures 
To develop a simultaneous optimization model, which determines the optimal procurement 
strategy as well as the efficient consortia structure from a total-cost-minimizing view, just the 
corresponding parameters, which describe the libraries’ demand of journals (hik, gik), have to 
be endogenized. Because for using electronic journals only one physical copy of the journal 
has to be held, hik will not become larger than 1. Further on, it is dominant to hold every 
wanted journal at most once in the whole consortium. So, yjk = 1 represents that consortium j 
subscribes to one printed copy of journal k. Because the model minimizes the total costs it is 
irrelevant which particular library holds the journal. In reality the paper-based journal often is 
even not delivered by the publisher, because the library has only storage expenses although 
nobody uses it. For that reason the model does not assign the journal to a specific library 
within the consortium. Thus, in this model we can abandon gik and hik.  The delivery costs 
(first sum term in the objective) now are based on the index j (i.e. the procurement entities) 
and the following model formulation results: 
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Equation 5: Simultaneous Optimization Model 
In fact, the optimal solution can only be realized in long term because of the contractual rela-
tionships between libraries and publishers, which usually ensure, that libraries can not reduce 
their stock of printed journals even within a few years.  
An application of this model to our empirical data will be the next step of our work. Due to 
the increased complexity, which is caused by the explicitly binary declaration of yjk , first of 
all appropriate solving mechanisms have to be found and to be evaluated. 
 
4. Conclusion and Further Research 
The presented paper gave an approach to a solution for optimizing the expenses which librar-
ies spend for procuring electronic journals. 
Based on empirical research it could be shown, that libraries can cut their procurement costs 
by canceling subscriptions and switching to ppv. For the second focus – optimizing the con-
sortia structure – a binary non-linear optimization model was developed and applied to a 
small real example, taken from our empirical research. 
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In the next steps of our work, based on the presented optimization model we will develop a 
branch & bound algorithm, which is able to handle larger instances of the consortia structure 
problem, presented in 3.2. Besides that, the simultaneous model (Equation 5) will also be 
applied to the chosen example. 
To provide the data, which is necessary to optimize the procurement type and the consortia 
structure, within our research project we began to establish a database, which prepares and 
pre-processes the monthly access counts (dik) for each library and journal. To import this data, 
converters have to be established to the publishers’ systems, because in most cases the elec-
tronic journals are hosted on their servers. Once this database is established, the necessary 
demand parameters for the optimization could be extracted as well as usage trend estimations 
could be made. Using an integrated database and optimization tool, an important contribution 
to improving the public supply of academic content can be provided. 
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